Recognizing Conflict and Threat
Monday, March 3, 2025
Some military experts have confused the American public to a degree. For an example, look to this quote from David Kilcullen, former COIN adviser to Gen. David Petraeus. In his book “The Accidental Guerrilla”, effective counterinsurgency provides human security to the population, where they live, 24 hours a day and not destroying the enemy. No wonder Americans are confused. They should be after reading statements like that. Destroying the enemy may not be the central task, but destroying his will to fight is, and to think otherwise is to ignore the whole history of warfare. If the history of warfare has shown us anything, it is that breaking the enemy’s will is best facilitated by constant physical attrition — something that America’s enemies in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan seem to grasp well. Sapping the enemy of his will to continue engaging in armed violence is — and must always be — the prime goal. On this, there should be no compromise.
What military leaders must understand and subsequently help others comprehend — something rarely accomplished — is to acknowledge that they are involved in war, albeit irregular warfare. Calling it something other than war not only confuses the people on whose behalf you are fighting, but it is also a futile attempt at changing the nature of war.
Either way, regular or irregular, the American military and its allies are engaged in nothing less than armed coercion to force those they are fighting to heed to their political intentions, to paraphrase the great Prussian. It is also an activity where your opponent is forcefully attempting to coerce you to his heed to his political will. Targeted warfare is simply one strategy in the U.S. arsenal that aims at breaking the enemy’s will to fight, and if given enough time, patience and resolution, then theoretically the strategy has high potential for success.
RECOGNIZE YOUR STRATEGY
Targeted warfare is not a policy; it is a strategy that exists in viable tactics, all of which are subordinate to policy. Policy and put it, is best described as “the rational subcomponent of politics, the reasoned purposes and actions of the various individual actors in the political struggle.” Strategy, on the other hand, refers to the use or threat of use of all instruments of power to secure political objectives. Colin Gray has expressed it as “the bridge that purposefully should connect means with ends, most especially military force with the political purposes for which it is applied.”
The policy of the U.S. government regarding militant members of the Taliban and al-Qaida in Pakistan and elsewhere is to persuade them to forgo the use of armed violence and, hopefully, to keep them out of power. Targeted warfare is just one strategy in pursuit of that policy, albeit with violent objectives. The goal of targeted warfare is therefore twofold: to violently remove armed militants from war and to serve the overall policy of convincing militants to abandon armed violence. To put it in simpler terms: The whole purpose of your government engaging in targeted warfare is to attempt to save your lives by killing people who want to kill you.
Further, there is no evidence to suggest that a strategy of targeted warfare is solely responsible for any form of “boomerang effect.” The truth is that any U.S.-led coalition action against militants may result in retaliatory action. That means that the results from targeted warfare would be no different from any other type of U.S. military activity, and it is far more likely to be surgical. And, as stated earlier, it is aimed at irreconcilables. In irregular warfare, the section of the population that is overtly taking up arms against you is rarely able to transition to neutral status. Additionally, it is a fallacy that violence always begets violence.
Throughout most of human history, violence used for political objectives always ends at some point and usually results in some form of peace, assuming that the policy is rational. What the American military, with assistance of the CIA, is attempting to do by engaging in a strategy of targeted warfare is to use limited force in pursuit of rational policy, ultimately leading to some type of peace.
RECOGNIZE VIABLE EXAMPLES
Targeted warfare, in the context of modern irregular warfare, has proven to be successful. Assuming that the policy is rational, and if the strategy and tactics are applied correctly, one can expect positive gains. Americans have already experienced this, given that they have successfully targeted more than half of al-Qaida’s top leaders. Yet, looking to others for examples never hurts, and the Israelis are a good example that Americans should be emulating, specifically Israeli targeted warfare against Hamas between 2000 and 2005. It is true that the Israelis are a different case from the Americans, but for the most part this is in relation to intelligence gathering — not in relation to policy, nor the strategy and tactics of targeted warfare.
In late September 2000, an armed conflict erupted in the Palestinian Administered Territories and eventually within Israel proper. From the Israeli perspective, the conflict can be viewed as counterterrorism backed up by pure military muscle. Ultimately, it was irregular warfare that involved a regular army against violent irregular politico-militant actors. While the Israelis have always dabbled in targeted killing operations, targeted warfare became highly and overtly operational during the five-year armed conflict.
The main reason that the Israelis chose to take this path was a reaction to the waves of suicide bombings against Israeli noncombatants that engulfed Israel proper. While the Israelis “hit” just about every militant organization in the territories, the bulk of targeted warfare was saved for the most effective Palestinian organization: Hamas.
Throughout the five-year conflict, leader after leader, engineer after engineer, and bomber after bomber were relentlessly pursued. The result was a decline in suicide bombings and calls from Hamas for ceasefires and “calms.” The decline in suicide bombings is also attributable to other Israeli counterterrorism activity, but by 2004 calls for ceasefires were, according to Israeli military and political leadership, as well as a number of studies on targeted killings, a direct result of targeted warfare. The Israelis were relentless in their strategy, and it eventually bore the fruits of policy objectives, albeit for a limited period.
American military and political leaders need to continue approaching targeted warfare with an open mind and beware of those exclaiming that the action is illegal, unethical, or ineffective. This strategy has the potential for being the most surgical and limited military force that any state can apply. As such, one might inquire why it is not applied more often. As is known, a one-off kill rarely produces immediate results; the strategy must be given time and applied with patience and resolution.
Breaking the enemy’s will to continue fighting is the goal. As strikes are being ramped up, it is high time that Americans embrace simple recognitions. First, a strategy of targeted warfare is legal. Second, it is proving to be effective. Third, the strategy is ethical, assuming of course that protecting American lives is a moral activity. Lastly, it is neither wrong nor taboo to observe others’ experiences in targeted warfare to better your own approach in warfare. Americans need to seize on this strategy, not squirm because of its application.
Released by the Stand Up America US Foundation
Copyrighted by Stand Up America US Foundation and MG Paul E. Vallely
Contact: suaus1961@gmail.com
www.standupamericaus.org